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INTRODUCTION
Today, the international monetary system is based largely on 
the US dollar, but reserve currency diversification has begun, 
thanks to the advent of the euro, and it is apt to continue. 
Eventually, the renminbi could acquire reserve currency status, 
and the resulting reserve currency diversification could be more 
disruptive than it has been to date. To forestall that possibility 
the quasi-currency issued by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), could be made to play 
a larger role in the international monetary system, precluding 
potentially disruptive diversification and achieving more orderly 
growth in the stock of international reserves. 
This policy brief proposes a way in which that objective 
could be achieved. It was written in response to a remark made 
by the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, but it harks 
back  to  an  earlier  attempt  to  establish  a  so-called  substitu-
tion account lodged in the IMF into which members of the 
IMF would deposit some of their substantial dollar reserves in 
exchange for SDRs. 
In some of the simulations summarized in this policy brief, 
the proposal is shown to be quite costly to the United States, but 
those simulations are deliberately designed to test the robust-
ness of the new regime and potential costs to the United States 
under strongly adverse circumstances. The “base case” simula-
tion, which traces what would have been the actual evolution of 
the substitution account from 1995 through 2008, imposes no 
cost whatsoever on the United States.
In the late 1970s the major industrial countries considered 
a proposal originating with the staff of the IMF for the creation 
of a substitution account under the auspices of the IMF. Had 
that proposal been adopted, central banks and governments 
would have been free to deposit some or all of their US dollar 
reserves in the account, obtaining in exchange claims denomi-
nated in SDRs. The proposal foundered, however, when the 
United States refused to take sole responsibility for maintain-
ing the dollar value of the SDR-denominated claims on the 
proposed account. No other arrangement was acceptable to 
the other governments involved in the negotiations.1 The US 
position was understandable. The US Congress could not be 
expected to endorse an arrangement under which the United 
States would have an open-ended financial obligation to guar-
antee the dollar value of the reserves deposited in the substitu-
tion account.
While the proposal was still under consideration, I ran 
simulations showing how a substitution account might evolve 
under various assumptions about the relevant interest rates and 
the dollar value of the SDR, and I published a paper on the 
1. On the proposal and subsequent negotiations, see: Boughton, James 
M. 2001. Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979–1989. 
Washington: International Monetary Fund; and Solomon, Robert. 1982.  The 
International Monetary System, 1945–1981. Revised Edition, Cambridge: 
Harper & Row. N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 6   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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subject.2 Thereafter, however, the subject lay dormant for nearly 
three decades. A search of the recent literature turned up only 
one brief favorable reference to the idea. 
Early last year, however, the subject was revived by Zhou 
Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, whose coun-
try holds more than $2.4 trillion of in reserves, largely in US 
dollars, and cannot readily diversify the currency composition 
of its huge reserves without causing a significant depreciation of 
the dollar vis-à-vis other major currencies. He suggested that a 
substitution account could meet China’s need to diversify the 
currency composition of its reserves without affecting exchange 
rates. It was Governor Zhou’s speech that caused me to return 
to the subject and produce the new simulations described in 
this policy brief. 
Going  further,  however,  I  suggest  that  a  substitution 
account, once in being, could be a bulwark against the further 
development of a multi-currency reserve system, which, in my 
view, could prove to be quite unstable. Most importantly, it 
could provide the basis for a far-reaching reform of the inter-
national reserve regime. The new regime would give the IMF a 
central role in the monetary system as the principal provider of 
reserve assets, relieving the United States of a role it has assumed 
heretofore without having explicitly assessed its benefits or costs. 
The new regime would not impose financial obligations on the 
United States, nor would it diminish the role of the dollar as 
the main medium of exchange for international transactions 
between private parties. 
THE FRAMEWORK
With the exception of one simulation shown later in table 2, 
the simulations summarized in this policy brief assume that 
a substitution account was created at the start of 1995 under 
the auspices of the IMF. At the start of that year, members of 
2. On the potential cost to the United States, see Kenen, Peter B. 1980. The 
Analytics of a Substitution Account. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review 19. (Reprinted in Kenen, P. B. 1994.Exchange Rates and the Monetary 
System, Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.)
. Bergsten, C. Fred. 2007. How to Solve the Problem of the Dollar. Financial 
Times. (December 11).
the IMF are assumed to deposit voluntarily US$1 trillion in a 
substitution account. They receive in exchange SDR-denomi-
nated claims at the then prevailing conversion rate between 
the dollar and the SDR. At the end of that year and every 
subsequent year through the end of 2008, they earn interest at 
the prevailing SDR interest rate, while the account itself earns 
interest from the United States at the 90-day US Treasury bill 
rate. The simulations close at the end of 2008 (which is not to 
suggest that the account would be terminated at that point). 
They are conducted on three bases:
n  With no additional dollar payments by the United States, 
even  when  the  dollar  value  of  the  SDR  claims  on  the 
account falls below the number of dollars in the account.
n  With an annual “deficiency payment” made by the United 
States whenever the number of dollars in the account would 
otherwise fall below the dollar value of the SDR claims on 
the account (i.e., when the account would otherwise be 
insolvent).
n  With an annual “cost-sharing payment” made by the Unit-
ed States in an amount equal to only half the gap between 
the number of dollars in the account and the dollar value 
of the SDR claims on the account, the implicit assumption 
being that the rest of the gap would be closed by the IMF 
itself by drawing on its own dollar holdings. 
Three summary figures are attached to each simulation:
n  The dollar surplus (+) or deficit (-) remaining in the account 
at the end of 2008.4
n  The sum of the deficiency or cost-sharing payments made 
by the United States to maintain the financial integrity of 
the account. 
n  The total cost to the United States of its involvement with 
the account.
The last of these numbers needs to be explained. The inter-
est earned by the IMF on the dollars deposited in the account 
does not constitute a cost to the United States, which would 
have had to pay interest on the dollars deposited in the account 
had they been retained by the depositors (although the interest 
rates involved might have been somewhat different). Hence, 
the cost to the United States is defined as the cumulative dollar 
cost plus compound interest of the deficiency or cost-sharing 
payments made by the United States after the establishment of 
the account.5
4. There can be a deficit at the end of a simulation, as no deficiency or cost-
sharing payment is made at the end of the final year. 
5. One more point must be made. In some simulations, the US interest rate 
and SDR interest rate are made to change independently (and in the “worst 
case” simulations, US interest is made to fall at the same time that the SDR 
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THE SIMULATIONS
Nine simulations are summarized in table 1. All of them are 
based on actual values of the US and SDR interest rate and the 
SDR-dollar exchange rate (until they are shocked permanently 
in the year 2000 in the manner described below). The simula-
tions themselves trace the year-by-year evolution of the account 
reflecting changes in the dollar value of the SDR, the interest 
rate paid by the IMF on the SDR-denominated liabilities of the 
account, and the US Treasury bill rate, which is the rate chosen 
to calculate the interest paid into the account by the United 
States.
The  base  case  simulation,  tracing  the  evolution  of  the 
account  from  1995  to  2008  using  actual  interest  rates  and 
the actual SDR-dollar exchange rate, does not display a single 
deficiency payment and thus imposes no cost whatsoever on 
the United States. The cumulative costs to the United States 
shown elsewhere in table 1 reflect large shocks to the interest 
rates and to the SDR-dollar exchange rate that I impose on the 
simulations starting in the year 2000. The costs of the inter-
est-rate shocks are fairly small, but those pertaining to cases in 
which the dollar depreciates vis-à-vis the SDR are larger, and 
they grow even larger in the “worst-case” scenario, where the US 
interest rate falls, the SDR interest rises, and the dollar depreci-
ates vis-à-vis the SDR simultaneously.7
With full deficiency payments by the United States, the 
cumulative cost to the United States is $22.0 billion in the 
simulation where the dollar depreciates vis-à-vis the SDR, and 
it rises to $51. billion in the “worst-case” simulation. Under 
a cost-sharing regime, the costs to the United States are, as 
expected, half as large as those with full deficiency payments, 
interest rate is made to rise). These “shocks” are unrealistic, because the SDR 
interest rate, like the SDR exchange rate, is a weighted average of national 
interest rates (those of the United States, United Kingdom, the euro area, and 
Japan), with the US rate accounting for more than 40 percent of the average. 
Hence, the simulations involving shocks to the US interest rate are pro-
grammed to allow for the interdependence of the two interest rates. Whenever 
the US interest rate is made to fall by 100 basis points, the SDR interest rate 
is reduced by 45 basis points. (When the SDR interest rate is made to rise, 
however, the US interest rate is not adjusted analogously. Hence, the shocks to 
the SDR interest rate must be deemed to reflect increases in the other interest 
rates that define the SDR interest rate (those of the United Kingdom, the 
eurozone, and Japan).
. In table 2 below, which replicates the base case historical scenario for a 
much longer period, there are nontrivial costs to the United States.
7. The “worst-case” scenarios are unrealistic, however, as they reflect large 
increases in the three non-dollar interest rates that enter the calculation of the 
SDR interest rate, even at a time when the US interest rate is made to fall. 
They are included to pre-empt criticism that the scenarios pay too little at-
tention to very bad outcomes from standpoint of the United States. It should 
also be noted that all of the shocks introduced in the year 2000 are quite large 
relative to the typical year-to-year changes in the variables. (These can be read-
ily calculated from the data in table 2, below, which provides a longer-term 
version of the base case simulation with full deficiency payments.)        
as the IMF is assumed to bear the other half of the total cost. 
There are, of course, other ways to maintain the solvency of 
the account, and some have been suggested by readers of this 
paper: 
n  The IMF itself could underwrite the solvency of the account 
in return for an annual fee paid by the governments depos-
iting dollars with it.
n  A  “counterpart”  account  could  be  established  by  the 
United States and lodged within the IMF; it would be 
debited whenever deficiency payments would otherwise be 
required and credited when the substitution account held 
surplus dollars.
n  Deficiency  or  cost-sharing  payments  could  be  based 
on a moving average of the relevant variables to reduce 
the frequency and size of the deficiency or cost-sharing 
payments.
These three, moreover, do not exhaust the possibilities. 
How large are the deficiency and cost-sharing payments 
shown in table 1, relative to well-known numbers? Consider 
the most costly simulation from the US standpoint, the worst-
case simulation with full deficiency payments. The cumulative 
total of deficiency payments was equal to 2. percent of total 
US foreign assets in at the end of 2008 and to . percent of 
US GDP in that same year. As for the average annual cost of 
the full deficiency payments, it was less than 0.2 percent of total 
US foreign assets in 2008 and less than 0. percent of US GDP. 
These are not small numbers, and they suggest that a different 
regime would be superior from the standpoint of the United 
States, such as the first of the three possibilities listed earlier—an 
annual fee charged to the depositors.8 It must be emphasized, 
however,  that  the  estimates  above  derive  from  simulations 
devised deliberately to produce high-end costs for the United 
States. The actual costs are apt to be considerably smaller. 
ANOTHER SIMULATION
As was indicated earlier, the simulations summarized in table 1 
begin in 1995, when foreign exchange holdings reported to the 
IMF totaled $1.9 trillion, of which only $1.04 trillion were 
allocated by currency and only $10 billion were US dollars. 
By implication, the $1 trillion figure used in the simulations 
considered above was too large for that year, all the more so 
because  participation  in  the  substitution  account  would  be 
voluntary.9 
8. This regime was also proposed by Michel Camdessus in his speech at a 
conference in China on November 10, 2009.
9. At the end of 2008, the last full year for which data were available when 
this paper was written, total foreign exchange reserves stood at the equivalent N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 6   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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For this reason, among others, another simulation is set 
out fully in table 2.10 It begins in 1980, chosen as that was the 
year in which the original proposal for a substitution account 
was rejected, and it runs through 2008, just like the simula-
tions summarized in table 1. It starts with a deposit of $500 
billion, half of the amount with which the previous simula-
tions started, and ends in 2008, just like those other simula-
tions.11 Unlike the base case simulation summarized in table 1, 
however, it displays a number of deficiency payments and thus 
a nonzero cost to the United States. But the average annual 
deficiency payment from the first to last year in which such 
payments were required was only $8.5 billion (and the aver-
age annual cost to the United States over the whole 29-year 
period covered by table 2 was just $9. billion).
BEYOND THE SUBSTITUTION ACCOUNT
The  introduction  of  a  substitution  account  may  over  time 
become a major step toward a more comprehensive reform of 
the international monetary system—a movement toward use 
of the SDR as a major reserve asset and, ultimately, the prima-
ry reserve asset. Absent a global market in which the SDR can 
be traded for national currencies, it cannot now perform the 
main function of a reserve currency, used for intervention to 
influence the value of a country’s currency. But a government 
holding SDRs created by the substitution account could be 
allowed to sell them to another IMF member in exchange for 
of $.45 trillion, of which $4.211 trillion were allocated by currency and 
$2.7 trillion were held in US dollars. (The large unallocated figure for 2008, 
at $2.44 trillion, strongly suggests that China is among the countries that do 
not report to the IMF the currency composition of their reserves.)
10. I am grateful to Jonathan Ostry, deputy director of the research depart-
ment at the IMF, for suggesting that I include this long-term simulation and 
arranging for me to receive the necessary data, but absolve him from all blame 
for anything written in this paper.
11. Like the starting figure of $1 trillion used in the simulation summarized in 
table 1, the starting figure of $500 billion is too large for a simulation starting 
in1980.
that country’s national currency, and then use that other coun-
try’s currency to intervene in the foreign exchange market.12 
Eventually, moreover, allocated SDRs and SDR claims on the 
substitution account should be consolidated, and obligations 
currently attaching to the possession of allocated SDRs would 
then attach to SDRs held in the substitution account.
Once these arrangements had been put in place, more-
over, any maintenance-of-value obligation assumed initially by 
the United States or by the participating countries themselves 
would be replaced by the existing obligation of the United 
States to accept SDRs from other IMF members in exchange 
for US dollars at the prevailing exchange rate between the 
dollar and the SDR. The membership of the IMF, moreover, 
should agree that the IMF will allocate additional SDRs on a 
regular basis at a predetermined rate (which could be changed 
from time to time as circumstances warrant).
It is thus conceivable that the SDR could become some-
thing close to a supranational reserve asset without vesting in 
any international institution such as the IMF the power to buy 
or sell a member’s currency at its discretion using SDRs.1 The 
members of the IMF, however, would have to vest in the IMF 
the authority to allocate additional SDRs on a regular basis to 
augment its members’ reserves in line with the growth of the 
global economy.14 
ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONS
n  How many “rounds” of substitution are likely to take place 
before the transformation of the substitution account into 
the full-fledged reserve account described above?
n  Should nondollar currencies, such as the euro, be included 
in the substitution process?
The answer to the first question depends, of course, on the 
initial size of the substitution account, if and when it is created. 
Table  describes the size and composition of currency reserves 
in 1995 and mid-2009. It shows that the share of the dollar 
has risen slightly when measured against the total of “allocated” 
12. That is the case, even now, in respect of SDRs created via periodic alloca-
tions, but immediate consolidation of allocated SDRs with those in the sub-
stitution account might be impractical for as long as a maintenance-of-value 
regime is attached to the SDRs in the substitution account. 
1. Proposals somewhat similar to this one have been made by others. See: 
Greenwald, Bruce, and Joseph Stiglitz. 2008. A Modest Proposal for Interna-
tional Monetary Reform. Paper prepared for the Istanbul Meeting of the Inter-
national Economic Association. (June); Helleiner, Eric. 2008. International 
Financial Imbalances and Global Governance. (July); and the speech by Michel 
Camdessus cited above. 
14. The IMF might also be authorized to accept members’ remaining or addi-
tional holdings of reserve currencies, but that process of ongoing substitution 
should probably be exercised at the Fund’s discretion, not at the discretion of 
individual governments.
“The introduction of a substitution 
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Table 2     Base case historical simulation, 1980 through 2008*
Deficiency payments made






























1980 1.99 9.06 11.4 500 84.91 500 0 0 0 0
1981 1.176 1.66 14.5 571.75 4.64 509.86 71.75 61.89 0 0
198 1.099 11.17 10.77 6. 48.08 59.8 61.58 10.5 0 0
198 1.064 8.6 8.87 689.5 5.54 557.04 56.18 1.46 0 0
1984 1.0 8.9 9.81 757.14 570.4 581.64 67.64 175.5 0 0
1985 1.0 7.81 7.7 815.67 614.77 67.07 58.5 188.6 0 0
1986 1.176 6.9 6.15 865.8 654.06 769.17 50.16 96.66 0 0
1987 1.99 5.87 5.95 917.5 69.45 899.49 51.5 17.86 0 0
1988 1.51 6.5 6.88 99.97 75.7 99.97 6.11 0 1.5 14.4
1989 1.8 8.7 8.9 1,077.6 796.57 1,01.1 8.9 56.15 0 15.64
        
1990 1.51 9.09 7.74 1,174 868.98 1,17.99 0 0 1.5 0.1
1991 1.7 7.7 5.5 1,8.41 96.07 1,8.41 64.9 0 4.49 7.89
199 1.408 6.6 .51 1,400.49 994.66 1,400.49 45.01 0 7.07 147.7
199 1.89 4.64 .06 1,445.69 1,040.8 1,445.69 4.86 –0.01 .4 151.5
1994 1.49 4.9 4.5 1,551.1 1,085.47 1,551.1 6.89 0 4.56 195.59
1995 1.515 4.58 5.65 1,719.8 1,15.18 1,719.8 87.64 0 81.0 78.58
1996 1.449 .9 5.14 1,808. 1,179.45 1,709.0 88.4 99.17 0 81.6
1997 1.6 4.07 5. 1,90. 1,7.46 1,669.4 94.0 .88 0 84.18
1998 1.51 4.11 4.9 1,995.44 1,77.91 1,76.45 9.1 68.98 0 87.0
1999 1.7 .48 4.77 ,090.6 1,. 1,811.59 95.18 79.0 0 89.89
   
000 1.16 4.44 6 ,16.06 1,81.04 1,817.44 15.44 98.61 0 9.79
001 1.66 .4 .48 ,9.18 1,48.5 1,808.9 77.1 484.89 0 95.7
00 1.99 .4 1.6 ,0.55 1,460.7 1,897.0 7.8 4.54 0 98.67
00 1.408 1.65 1.0 ,54. 1,484.45 ,090.1 .77 64. 0 01.66
004 1.471 1.84 1.9 ,87.05 1,511.7 ,.71 .7 16.4 0 04.68
005 1.471 .6 .1 ,46.68 1,551.07 ,81.6 76.6 18.06 0 07.7
006 1.471 .69 4.85 ,58.16 1,608.4 ,65.86 119.49 17. 0 10.8
007 1.58 4.05 4.45 ,698.11 1,67.47 ,57.8 114.95 14.1 0 1.91
008 1.587 .56 1.7 ,75.08 1,716. ,7.79 6.96 11.9 0 17.05
Dollar surplus (+) or deficit in account at end of 008: 11.9  
Total of US deficiency or cost-sharing payments: 69.4  
Total cost to United States** 17.05  
*Entries for 1995 through 008 may not exactly match those in table 1, both because the basic data come from different sources and because they start in different years with 
different amounts of dollars deposited initially. Note, however, that the size of the account shown here has come to exceed $1,000 billion well before 1995, the year in which 
those other simulations begin.
**See note to table 1.
Source: IMF and author’s computations.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 6   m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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reserves (i.e., those of countries that report voluntarily to the 
IMF  the  currency  composition  of  their  reserves).  It  would 
appear, moreover, that China is not included in this country 
group. If it were included, the share of the dollar would rise 
appreciably from  percent of allocated reserves to something 
in the neighborhood of 70 percent.15 But other major dollar-
holding countries would have to support and participate in the 
creation of a substitution account, and we cannot even infer 
from Governor’s Zhou’s much quoted remarks, cited at the start 
of this paper, that China itself would deposit a large share of its 
dollar reserves in a substitution account. 
It would thus seem that two or three rounds of substitu-
tion, stretching across a decade might be required before the 
15. This rough estimate employs the common supposition that some  
70 percent of China’s reserves are held in dollars.
participants (and others) agreed to the consolidation of their 
SDR claims on the substitution account with their allocated 
SDRs so as to create a single SDR reserve account. Yet that is 
not a long time to wait for a fundamental transformation of the 
international monetary system. In the interim, the IMF should 
resume annual allocations at, say, SDR 200 billion per year to 
raise the share of the SDR in total reserves.
The second question can also be answered by the data in 
table . The euro accounts for little more than a quarter of allo-
cated reserves. Hence, a significant fall in its share might not 
disrupt the international monetary system to the same extent 
as a large shift away from the dollar. Yet it would be impossible 
to convert the substitution account into a full-fledged reserve 
account without the participation of IMF members that pres-
ently  hold  mainly  euro  reserves.  Otherwise,  they  could  not 
acquire the SDR-denominated claims required for full partici-
pation in the reserve account. In other words, countries that 
hold mainly euros may not be greatly interested in substitution 
per se, but they would surely want to participate in the reserve 
account if and when it is established and would have then to 
deposit some of their currency reserves with the IMF in order 
to acquire the SDR balances required for participation in the 
reserve account.
CONCLUSION
The simulations described in this policy brief make clear that 
the creation of a substitution account might be costly to the 
United States, depending on the nature of the maintenance-
of-value regime adopted to protect the solvency of the substi-
tution account. The cost could be greatly reduced, however, by 
adopting a cost-sharing regime or assessing an annual fee on 
the depositors in the account. The cost to the United States, 
moreover, must be weighed against another cost that cannot 
be readily quantified: the effect of reserve currency diversifica-
tion by central banks that now hold far larger dollar reserves 
than they are apt to need to cope with balance-of-payments 
problems. Large-scale diversification could cause a substan-
tial and highly disorderly depreciation of the dollar. It would 
thus be prudent to give serious thought to Governor’s Zhou’s 
suggestion that we revisit the potential benefits and costs of a 
substitution account lodged in the IMF.
Table 3     Currency composition of foreign exchange 
  reserves in 1995 and 2009
Currency
Billions of US dollar 
equivalents
Percentage of total 
allocated reserves
End of 1995
Total currency reserves 1,89.8 —
Allocated reserves 1,04. 100.0
US dollars 610. 59.0
Pounds 1.9 .1
Euro area currencies 79.1 7.0
Swiss francs .1 0.
Yen 70.1 6.8
Other currencies 49.4 4.8
Unallocated 55.6 —
End of June 2009
Total currency reserves 6,801.1 —
Allocated reserves 4,69.5 100.0
US dollars ,680.5 6.8
Pounds 184. 4.
Euros 1,17.8 7.5
Swiss francs 5. 0.1
Yen 11.9 .1
Other currencies 94.9 .
Unallocated ,51.5 —
Source: International Monetary Fund, Composition of Official Foreign Exchange 
Reserves, various issues. Euro area currencies in 1995 include European currency 
unit claims.
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